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Abstract
Markets for spectrum were first proposed by Ronald Coase [1] as a
way to efficiently allocate this resource. It took another forty years for
primary markets to be developed (in the form of spectrum auctions)
as the mechanism for assigning spectrum licenses to users. It is not a
secret that secondary markets would be necessary to fully realize the
benefits of economic allocation of spectrum. But this is easier said
than done, since spectrum is a complex, multi-dimensional product
with relatively few buyers and sellers (at least for commercial mobile
services), so liquid secondary markets have not emerged, even though
spectrum trading through brokers is commonplace.
In this paper, we find that liquidity for spectrum markets can
be improved over “naked” spectrum markets [2, 3] when a standard-
ized commodity can be traded that uses the principles of spectrum
virtualization [4]. We utilize the Physical Resource Blocks (PRBs)
of LTE-Advanced as the traded commodity and modify the SPEC-
TRAD model developed in [5] accordingly. Though much remains to
be done, we find that this is a promising approach to finally realizing
liquid secondary markets in radio spectrum.
1
1 Introduction
Liquid secondary markets for radio spectrum remain an elusive goal. Al-
though license trading is fairly active in the US [6], transparent, liquid mar-
kets similar in nature to commodities exchanges are not. Previous research
showed that simulated spectrum trading markets (called SPECTRAD)are
not liquid when considering the features of today’s mobile carrier industry [2].
Over the past several years, we have continued to analyze the feasibility of
secondary markets for spectrum by first breaking some of the idealistic con-
siderations built into SPECTRAD, which is described in detail in [5]. In
particular, we modified the model to include the reality that spectrum is
not perfectly fungible, which had an impact on the liquidity of markets.
With this in mind, our goal in this paper is to find a scenario that would
adapt “smoothly” to the multidimensionality characteristics of spectrum. By
“smoothly” we mean that this constraint would become transparent to the
users and does not increase transaction costs exponentially to the point of
making markets inoperable.
With this in mind, we apply the concept of wireless networks virtual-
ization based on LTE-Advanced features to explore how this results in a
new trading commodity and adapts to existing notions of secondary markets
for spectrum trading. Our overall goal is to determine whether these new
considerations make markets thicker, which increase the users’ willingness
to participate without a major increase of costs and congestion. In other
words, we wish to determine whether we could obtain viable, yet realizable
secondary spectrum market by incorporating LTE-A virtualization concepts
to our secondary spectrum market model, we obtain viable, yet realizable,
markets.
1.1 Background
First of all, we would like to take a quick look back and remember some
of the reasons that render the analysis of secondary markets for spectrum
important.
1.1.1 Spectrum Markets Overview
From a general perspective, a secondary market can be defined as the mar-
ket in which a seller of a good is not the one selling that good for the first
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time [6]. A primary market for spectrum was established in the 1990s with
the adoption of spectrum auctions; nevertheless, the fixed spectrum alloca-
tion approach accompanying the primary market led to scarcity and other in-
efficiencies, which have driven researchers, industry members and regulators
to seek for alternate solutions. The Federal Communications Commission
considered the creation of secondary markets for spectrum in 2000. In one
of its first Policy Statements regarding this matter, it is stated:
We believe that an expanded system of private sector mar-
kets will serve the public interest by creating new opportunities
for increasing the communications capacity and efficiency of spec-
trum use by licensees. Such secondary market transactions will
thereby complement the primary assignment function performed
by the Commission through its spectrum auctions and licensing
processes. While secondary markets are not a substitute for find-
ing additional spectrum when needed and should not supplant
our spectrum allocation process, a robust and effective secondary
market for spectrum usage rights could help alleviate spectrum
shortages by making unused or underutilized spectrum held by
existing licensees more readily available to other users and uses
and help to promote the development of new, spectrum efficient
technologies”.1
Supporting the validity of secondary markets, Professor Peter Cramton sug-
gested, “secondary markets are essential for the efficient and intensive use of
spectrum. Secondary markets identify gains from trade that are unrealized
by the primary market which in this case is the FCC spectrum auctions”.2
The statements above portray the initial objectives supporting the de-
velopment of secondary markets for spectrum. Further analyses perceive
secondary markets as a means to ensure that, with changes in demand and
supply, spectrum will migrate to more efficient uses, including those by par-
ties not belonging to the initial allocation [6]. Note that embedded in all
these considerations is one of the most important goals of secondary mar-
kets, which is to assign spectrum to users (and uses) who value it the most.
1Federal Communications Commission Policy Statement in the matter of Principles for
Promoting the Efficient Use of Spectrum by Encouraging the Development of Secondary
Markets. p.1.
2Professor Peter Cramton Statement at the Secondary Market Forum of the Federal
Communications Commission. May 31, 2000.
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It is important also to mention that the prices set in the market have the
ability to capture information regarding demand and supply in a manner
that outperforms that of a centralized entity [7], reflecting the actual status
of the interactions of buyers and sellers and, consequently, the real spectrum
valuation.
Over time, we have come across several characteristics that secondary
markets should have and the challenges these markets would encounter in
their efficient development. In the FCC Policy Statement from December
2000, five essential elements for a market system to operate most effectively
are mentioned:
• Clearly defined economic rights
• Full information on prices and products available to all participants
• Mechanisms for bringing buyers and sellers together to make transac-
tions with a minimum of administrative cost and delay
• Easy entry and exit to the market by both buyers and sellers
• Effective competition, with many buyers and sellers.
In [8] the author mentions that the success of a secondary market for spec-
trum depends on the trading mechanism for minimizing transaction costs and
maximizing the traders’ surplus. Additionally, spectrum sellers and buyers
should be given appropriate incentives for participating in the market (e.g.,
spectrum buyers obtaining spectrum to provide the same service as the sellers
may reduce the willingness of the licensee to offer his spectrum for sale; spec-
trum buyers should be given guarantees of the availability of the spectrum
they are acquiring). Further, in [9], Crocioni mentions several constraints
that contribute to the delay in the deployment of secondary markets, among
which we shall highlight the heterogeneity of spectrum, which might give rise
to various secondary spectrum markets. Consequently, the information on
the price paid for a specific frequency may not be indicative of the value of
another frequency.
The aforementioned facts reinforce Professor Cramton’s observation in the
first FCC Forum for the discussion of secondary markets, where he envisioned
that getting to the point in which spectrum becomes a true commodity in
the marketplace will take some time and a lot of work due to the complexities
inherent in radio spectrum.
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Even under the presence of important constraints and challenges, as in
any other market type, in a secondary market for spectrum, trade will occur
if a market entrant (or another incumbent) values a given spectrum por-
tion more than the current incumbent and if the difference between the two
valuations is larger than the transaction costs [9].
1.1.2 The Appropriate Trading Commodity
It is quite clear that our asset of interest, in this particular market, is elec-
tromagnetic spectrum. Nevertheless, when we think about electromagnetic
spectrum, its variability and multidimensionality are the features that will
mostly draw our attention. Various authors define a number of these dimen-
sions; for instance, in [10] Matheson and Morris define seven dimensions in
which spectrum can vary: frequency, time, three dimensions of location (lat-
itude, longitude and elevation) and two dimensions of arrival (azimuth and
elevation angles). For a market to be successful, we would need a “one-to-
one” match of supply and demand, or in other words, as Mayo and Wallsten
express in [6], “Successful secondary market transfers require an alignment of
the buyers’ demands for spectrum of a particular dimension with the willing-
ness of spectrum holders to supply spectrum in the same dimension”. Under
this conditions we would expect the resulting markets to be thin, yielding a
lack of liquidity.
Spectrum trading scenarios have already been analyzed under the condi-
tions mentioned above [3,11], in which the trading commodity was considered
to be “naked spectrum”. In [11], electromagnetic spectrum was regarded
as perfectly fungible, creating in this manner a completely homogeneous
commodity. By incorporating fungibility limitations and constraints to the
model, in [3], we could determine how this affected the trading choices and
patterns of users and thus the final market viability result. In both cases,
liquidity outcomes were reached; not surprisingly, those of the second case
were fewer than those of the first, homogeneous case. However, as presented
in [3], the market scenarios associated with liquidity in the second case are
difficult to envision in reality (e.g., market liquidity involves the participation
of a higher number of secondary users than the number of participants in the
current telecommunications market). Thus, we believe that it is critical to
determine a spectrum-related commodity that would permit us to maintain
the market thickness obtained when trading a homogeneous commodity; in
other words, a commodity that would bypass the spectrum heterogeneity
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constraints.
One possible approach to reach that goal would be to make some of the
physical attributes of spectrum transparent to buyers and sellers and find
a substitute commodity appealing to their needs. We find this achievable
through wireless network virtualization.
1.1.3 Wireless Networks Virtualization
In a broad sense, virtualization refers to the creation of a virtual version of
something, rather than the actual thing itself [12]. Nevertheless, when we
think of network virtualization, we tend to more generally associate this con-
cept with Computer Science. In [13], a thorough definition of this type of vir-
tualization is provided: “Network virtualization is any form of partitioning or
combining a set of network resources, and presenting (abstracting) it to users
such that each user, through its set of partitioned or combined resources has a
unique, separate view of the network. Resources can be fundamental (nodes,
links) or derived (topologies), and can be virtualized recursively. Node and
link virtualization involve resource partition/combination/abstraction; and
topology virtualization involves new address spaces”.
This concept maps quite well to the particular virtualization scope that we
would like to focus on, which is Wireless Networks Virtualization. Within
these networks, different components can be virtualized, and according to
them, again, virtualization can take different shapes and nuances. As stated
in [13], a given type of virtual network could become a different type of
virtual network once we change the perspective. For instance, within the
domain of wireless networks virtualization, we could explore infrastructure
virtualization, air-interface virtualization or the virtualization of additional
network components. Hence, even if at the basis we are dealing with the
same network, by applying different types of virtualization, we will surely
obtain distinct perspectives and thus achieve results specific to them.
One of the main reasons behind the development of wireless networks vir-
tualization is to create such a network that could foster a greater amount of
spectrum users, by means of creating further alternatives in terms of using,
sharing, accessing and assigning the existing resources. For instance, through
infrastructure virtualization and sharing, costs for new market entrants would
be significantly reduced, thus increasing the incentives for new network op-
erators to participate in the market. Additionally, a myriad of new services
could be offered while using the same resources that were previously used
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by only one network operator. Further, as mentioned in [14], virtualization
brings flexibility to the network; in other words, it gives the operators the
required capabilities to expand or shrink their networks, according to their
needs, without incurring in prohibitive costs.
Delving a little bit deeper into the virtualization of wireless networks,
we can point out some interesting approaches presented in [4, 15–17]. In
the aforementioned works, the resources belonging to the primary users of
wireless networks are considered to be part of a pool, which is then made
available, not to a single user, but to a large number of them. The notion of
having a common pool of resources will, in turn, allow for a wider range of
contributors to this pool, in addition to representing increasing incentives for
investment in infrastructure [4]. It is also worth pointing out that a special
focus on the restructuring of the network value chain 3 is made. Indeed, the
new value chain envisioned is aimed at providing the opportunity for parallel
coexisting activities, the opportunity for a wider variety of participants, in
addition to the opportunity for specialized as well as mainstream activities
[4].
In our work, we would like to emphasize this particular nuance of vir-
tualization: the creation of a pool of resources, to which spectrum users
can contribute, and from which they can benefit. It is clear that there is
a large amount of (possible) resources pertaining to the pool; however, in
this stage, we will focus our attention on the electromagnetic spectrum and
its role within the pool. The specific technology that will accompany our
wireless network virtualization analysis is LTE-Advanced. An overview of
the advantages and constraints of this choice are presented in what follows.
1.1.4 LTE-Advanced
Long Term Evolution, LTE, originated as an standard whose main objec-
tives were to minimize the system and user equipment complexities, allow a
more flexible spectrum allocation in the existing or newly available frequency
bands and to enable co-existence with current and legacy radio access tech-
nologies [18]. The migration from LTE to LTE-Advanced was driven by
the incorporation of distinct features that would allow for the enhancement
of the network and achievement of higher capacity. The most important
3“The value chain includes all the activities that exist as a result of usage of the cellular
network. The purpose of creating the chain is to understand where the costs are incurred
and the revenue is generated” [4]
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new additions found in LTE-Advanced are the capability to perform carrier
aggregation in order to achieve wider bandwidths; enhanced multi-antenna
techniques in the uplink an downlink and support for the use of relay nodes,
which connect to relay-enabled eNBs, thus improving throughput.4
In LTE, the Physical Resource Block (PRB) is the basic element for radio
resource allocation. A PRB is a set of resource elements, which are time-
frequency resource-units for uplink and downlink transmission. Resource
elements can be defined as one sub-carrier over one OFDM symbol. In total,
12 OFDM subcarriers, contiguous in frequency, over one slot in time will
form a PRB. Summing up, the time-frequency region that encloses a PRB
corresponds to a 0.5 millisecond-time slot and 180 kHz in the frequency
domain (12 subcarriers x 15 kHz each) [18,19].
The minimum size of radio resource that can be allocated is the minimum
Time Transmission Interval (TTI) in the time domain, which corresponds to
one subframe of 1 millisecond, which in turn corresponds to two resource
blocks. Subframes can be further grouped into frames of 10 milliseconds
length with specific arrangements of the PRBs for FDD and TDD transmis-
sion.
The number of allocated PRBs will contribute to the bandwidth a specific
user can count on for given transmission; nevertheless, the actual number of
PRBs that users can be allocated is determined by the standard and is pre-
sented in the following table. Additionally, Table 1 provides information on
further details associated to the allocation of the PRBs, such as the required
guardband, the actual occupied bandwidth and the number of subcarriers
involved in the transmission [19,20]
LTE Parameters for Downlink Transmission
Number of Resource blocks 6 15 25 50 75 100
Number of Occupied Subcarriers 72 180 300 600 900 1200
Transmission Bandwidth [MHz] 1.4 3 5 10 15 20
Occupied Bandwidth [MHz] 1.1 2.7 4.5 9.0 13.5 18.0
Guardband [MHz] 0.32 0.3 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0
Table 1: LTE Parameters for Downlink Transmission
Using the carrier aggregation capabilities of LTE-A, when wider band-
4http://www.3gpp.org/technologies/keywords-acronyms/97-lte-advanced
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widths are required, these can be defined in contiguous and non-contiguous
spectrum deployments and can sum up to 100 MHz. These bandwidths can
be achieved through the aggregation of up to five component carriers. The
individual component carriers could have different bandwidths and the num-
ber of aggregated carriers could be different in uplink and downlink; however,
the number of uplink component carriers cannot be larger than the number
of downlink component carriers.5 Due to the discontinuous nature of the
spectrum that has been reserved for this technology, the bandwidth avail-
able is rather fragmented. Hence, the user terminals should have filtering,
processing and decoding capabilities for this large and variable bandwidth.
This certainly increases the complexity of the user terminals and is one of
the major challenges contemplated by the LTE standard [18,21]
As can be observed in Table 1, there is a specific and direct mapping
between the number of PRBs and transmission bandwidth. In this paper, we
plan to make use of this mapping to manage the spectrum-related commodity
available within the pool of resources. In other words, we would like the pool
of resources to be composed of a certain number of PRBs which in turn
correspond to specific values of bandwidth that can be further translated
into capacity rates. Note that by applying the carrier aggregation concepts
and features, we can merge resources from the pool in order to obtain greater
bandwidths and thus higher capacity values. As expected, this is the point
in which the actual physical electromagnetic frequency becomes transparent
to the users, and they are asked to deal with an additional, perhaps more
manageable feature, which is capacity.
It is worth mentioning that another important reason to consider LTE-A
for our analysis is that spectrum users will be utilizing devices compatible
with this standard. Thus, we are not concerned about the capabilities of the
equipment antennas to tune to the range of frequencies pertaining to this
standard (at least within a given country), even if this range is discontinuous.
2 Methods
As mentioned in section 1.1.3, if we narrow down the scope of virtualization
one step further and adapt it to this paper, we can study the specifics of
one of the resources pertaining to the aforementioned pool: spectrum. As
part of the pool, spectrum will be accessible to a larger number of network
5http://www.3gpp.org/technologies/keywords-acronyms/97-lte-advanced
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operators, instead of being available only to the incumbent. The distribution
of the spectrum resources from the pool could be well performed via spectrum
markets as stated in [4,17], which is an approach that could well fit with our
secondary markets for spectrum trading framework. Nonetheless, we shall
remember that licensed spectrum has long been considered as the bottleneck
of the modern-day wireless networks and as the particular resource for which
there are no substitutes in the network [17]. However, even if there are not
actual physical substitutes for “naked spectrum”, we could adapt additional
notions of wireless virtualization in order to make this resource more readily
available and create the illusion of infinite resources that is needed to fulfill
the spectrum demands [4], which may also represent the enhancement of
liquidity of secondary markets for spectrum that we are looking for.
By appealing to spectrum virtualization, then, we switch focus from con-
stituting a pool of electromagnetic frequencies to a pool of spectrum-related
commodities that would be more easily manageable in the market. By this
we mean, commodities whose underlying frequencies would be transparent to
the users accessing the market, thus giving them further opportunities and
taking away the constraints related to the physical frequencies incompatibil-
ities.
Our choice of interest, regarding the appropriate market commodity,
would be to contemplate the trading of wireless capacity. In such a sce-
nario, users would bid for specific amounts of capacity that they would need
to fulfill their traffic requirements without being concerned about which are
the actual electromagnetic frequencies that are available in the market. A
central entity (i.e., Band Manager) would be in charge of performing the ap-
propriate mapping of the capacity required by the buyers with the capacity
available in its inventories, which in turn belongs to the pool of spectrum
resources.
Even though we are making physical frequencies transparent in the mar-
ket through virtualization, we shall still consider the technical feasibility of
this approach. For example, an important constraint to consider is that de-
vices are technically limited in their capabilities to tune to a wide range of
frequencies. So, as a first step toward the analysis of the viability of this
method and the actual impact in the market liquidity, we propose that the
frequencies belonging to a specific technology, such as LTE-A, should be con-
sidered. Hence, we can assume that all the users involved in the trade are
capable of tuning to all the physical frequencies associated with the capacity-
offers that are available in the market. This is not a limiting assumption since
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end user devices will all (eventually) have this capability anyway.
In conclusion, we can summarize the concepts and ideas we have ex-
plored so far as follows: The management and distribution of the resources
pertaining to the pool will be in charge of the secondary markets for spec-
trum trading via auction methods. The specific reason why we are appealing
to virtualization is to enhance the market transactions and hopefully bring
more liquidity to the market, given that at this instance, our objective is to
make markets thicker. This is done by making the electromagnetic frequency
transparent to the users when we switch the trading commodity from “naked
spectrum” to a more manageable one, such as wireless capacity. In such a
trading environment, users should only be concerned about bidding for the
required amounts of capacity to fulfill traffic requirements, irrespective of the
underlying electromagnetic frequency. At this specific point, we are ensuring
the physical feasibility of our proposal given that our work is framed within
the LTE-A standard.
For this to render a successful market, users should have the appropriate
guarantees about the commodities they are acquiring and thus the incentives
to enter and remain active in the market (i.e., markets should be safe). These
would be the specific perspectives of virtualization that we would like to
incorporate into our secondary markets for spectrum trading framework and
the benefits we desire to obtain from this fusion.
2.1 Model Details
In order to test the viability of the incorporation of virtualization concepts
to secondary markets for spectrum trading, we have adapted our new struc-
ture to the existing spectrum trading agent-based model presented in [11]:
SPECTRAD. In what follows, we will provide details regarding the mar-
ket structure considered, the market participants, the commodities available
in the market and the market transactions (e.g., the bidding and spectrum
assignment process. So that our results might be comparable with the pre-
viously published results, we have kept the essential aspects of SPECTRAD
intact.
2.1.1 Market Structure
The market type considered in our model is a Band Manager Exchange-
based market. In general terms, this type of market model will have similar
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characteristics as those of the Band Manager Exchange presented in [11]; the
Spectrum Exchange is the central entity of the market and its Band Manager
functionality implies that the Exchange holds a spectrum inventory from
which it has to assign leases to the spectrum requesters in the market. In
this paper, the spectrum inventory that the Exchange holds corresponds to
the previously mentioned spectrum pool. Additionally, when performing the
spectrum-lease assignment process, the Band Manager will have to take into
account the specific needs of the spectrum users without being oblivious to
the requirements of the LTE-A standard. The two most important tasks that
the Band Manager needs to consider is the assignment of PRBs in sets allowed
by the standard (see Table 1) and the performance of carrier aggregation to
provide for higher capacity requirements.
2.1.2 Market Participants
In the Band Manager Exchange-based markets, the spectrum users will be
license requesters who are seeking spectrum in the market to fulfill their traf-
fic obligations. Here, we envision these license requesters as Mobile Virtual
Network Operators (MVNOs) or spectrum resellers who will be in charge
of providing the spectrum acquired in the secondary market to their final
customers.
Spectrum requesters can belong to one of three different levels of valuation
of the spectrum: high, medium or low, according to the type of service they
will provide. Along this lines, the level of spectrum valuation a given user
has, will be directly proportional to his capacity requirements and to the
stringency of the quality of service he needs to comply with. It follows that
the price that the spectrum requester is willing to pay will be consistent with
his own valuation of the spectrum.
The specific capacity requirements of each spectrum user, within the ser-
vice area, are modeled as an exponentially distributed aggregate traffic de-
mand with a mean of 4.0 Mbps. The interval between changes of traffic
demand is modeled with an exponential distribution as well, with a mean
value that is uniformly distributed between 10 and 25 simulation-time units.
2.1.3 Trading Commodities
The core of the analysis that we have performed is to develop a commodity
that could improve the liquidity of the secondary markets for spectrum. In
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this light, we modified the existing spectrum units or bandwidth units pro-
posed in the original model of SPECTRAD [11], and we incorporated a new
spectrum unit, which is compliant with the technology that we have chosen,
which is LTE-A. The new units of spectrum sold in the market are Physical
Resource Blocks or PRBs.
The number of resource blocks that are available in the market correspond
to the pool inventory (i.e., the number of PRBs that the primary users of
spectrum have decided to provide for trade in the pool); however, secondary
user can be assigned PRBs only according to what the LTE-A standard
dictates, which is, according to the allowable number of PRBs. In our model
for resource availability, we have considered 3 bands of 10 MHz each in the 700
MHz range, which, approximately, correspond to the bands 13 (746 MHz - 756
MHz), 14 (758 MHz - 768 MHz) and 17 (734 MHz - 746 MHz). These bands
have been made available for LTE in the United States. The reason we have
chosen these bands is because they provide relatively fungible transmission
parameters due to their range similarity.
The bandwidth or size of the PRBs is determined according to the LTE-
A standard (see Table 1). Note that the actual value that we have used for
our calculations is that of the Occupied Bandwidth, which corresponds to
the Transmission Bandwidth - Guardband. In order to determine the traffic
capacity of the PRBs, we have calculated the actual capacity that could be
obtained with the bandwidth available to the highest frequency belonging to
the available bands (so that we could portray the worst case scenario) using
the Shannon Capacity formula (1). Where the signal corresponds to the
power received at 1 Km from the receiver with the considered frequency using
COST231 Walfish-Ikegami Model. The noise is calculated using equation
(2), where F is the noise figure, K is the Boltzmann constant, To is the noise
temperature and B is the considered bandwidth value.
C = B log2
(
1 +
S
N
)
(1)
N = FKToB (2)
In the original SPECTRAD model, secondary users had the choice of
opting for “alternate technologies” in case the spectrum price in the auction
was above their price limit or in case spectrum was scarce in the market.
Instead, we have linked the notion of alternate technologies directly to any
type of unlicensed spectrum (e.g., TV Whitespaces, IEEE 802.11) that the
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spectrum requesters could opt for, when the PRBs in the market are not
accessible. Note that spectrum requesters need to bear in mind that the
quality of service they will receive with unlicensed spectrum is lower than
that of licensed spectrum; hence, users valuation of licensed spectrum will be
inversely proportional to their valuation of the alternate, unlicensed spectrum
option. In this particular work, we have chosen TV Whitespaces in the 700
MHz band so that we remain in a close range to the LTE bands pertaining
to the core of our analysis. Note that this assumption does not limit our
choices for additional unlicensed bands, given that nowadays, most devices
are in fact compatible with a large number of these frequencies.
In order to keep consistency with the basic LTE units, and considering
that one PRB has a bandwidth of 180 KHz, we have considered this same
basic unit for calculating the transmission capacity of unlicensed spectrum in
our model. In this way, one unit of unlicensed spectrum will provide a level
of capacity equivalent to the amount that can be achieved with 180 KHz of
unlicensed spectrum operating in the 700 MHz band.
2.1.4 Market Transactions
We follow the assumption made in [11], which considers that the mechanism
for matching buyers and sellers in the spectrum exchange is continuous double
auctions. In this particular setting, we will be assigning the spectrum in
the pool (provided by the spectrum licensees) to the spectrum requesters
participating in the market.
In each bidding round, spectrum users will calculate their required amount
of PRBs according to the traffic they have to meet. Based on their needs
and on the maximum price they are willing to pay, users will post a bid in
the current bidding round. At the end of each bidding round, the exchange
will organize the bids according to price. If the demand is greater than the
supply, the exchange will calculate the cutoff price according to the number
of PRBs it can assign based on the LTE standard; otherwise, the cutoff price
will be the minimum cutoff price set by the exchange, which has been set
to 50.00 monetary units. After each bidding round, the cutoff price will be
announced to the users, and they will decide to adjust their bids accordingly.
Several bidding rounds will be conducted until the variation of the cutoff
price is less than 0.5% from one round to the following or until a (preset)
maximum number of bidding rounds is reached.
Once the bidding rounds have concluded, the spectrum assignment pro-
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cess takes place. It is performed by the exchange according to the LTE-A
standard parameters and making use of carrier aggregation capabilities. In
this way, the exchange will calculate the number of resource blocks to assign
to the spectrum requesters taking into account the resources that it has in
inventory and the possibilities that the standard provides for the aggrega-
tion. After the assignment process, the spectrum requesters will compare the
amount of capacity they can meet with the resources received and the actual
required capacity, and in case the resources received from the exchange are
not enough, they will decide to use extra unlicensed spectrum units.
The PRBs’ lease lasts 10 simulation-time units, which we map to the
duration of an LTE frame, which is known to be 10 milliseconds. Once the
10 millisecond-period is over, the previously assigned PRBs return to the
exchange inventory.
As we mentioned at the beginning of this subsection, we have been con-
cerned about keeping the essential aspects of SPECTRAD intact in order
to retain a constant basis for comparability. In this light, for our analysis,
we have considered two cases regarding the duration of the unlicensed spec-
trum usage period. The first case exactly maps the duration of the “Alternate
Technology units” (the alternative to licensed spectrum in the original model)
to the duration of the unlicensed spectrum usage period; hence, a spectrum
user will hold the bandwidth units of unlicensed spectrum for a period that
will be uniformly distributed between 90 and 110 simulation time units. In
the second case, we have diverged from this setting and we have assumed that
the usage of unlicensed spectrum will last as long as the licensed spectrum
lease (i.e., 10 milliseconds). This interpretation will permit us to simulate
possible degradation in the service due to the large number of users shar-
ing unlicensed spectrum and, perhaps more importantly, the fact that users
would be allowed to enter the market one more time and analyze whether
the conditions are profitable, granting them access to licensed PRBs.
In each of the two cases, users will enter the new set of bidding rounds to
acquire a new licensed spectrum lease according to their current unlicensed
spectrum holdings and traffic requirements.
The market transactions will last 5000 simulation time units (time ticks),
from which 3000 are considered as warm-up period and the last 2000 will
provide the data that will be analyzed and presented in our results section.
Table 2 presents a summary of important parameters relevant to the
SPECTRAD model presented in this section.
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General Model Parameters
Bandwidth (occupied) of
the PRBs [MHz]
Values permitted by the standard:
[1.08, 2.7, 4.5, 9, 13.5, 18].
Using carrier aggregation we can ob-
tain up to 54 MHz.
Traffic capacity of a PRB
[Mbps]
Calculated according to the Band-
width associated to the set of PRBs
assigned, using the Shannon Capac-
ity formula.
Min = 4.06 Mbps, Max = 15.5 Mbps
Trading capacity of an Un-
licensed Transmission Unit
[Mbps]
1.18 Mbps - Capacity calculated for
180 KHz of bandwidth with the 700
MHz band
PRBs lease time 10 time ticks (simulation time units)
Unlicensed spectrum usage
time
Case 1: Uniformly distributed be-
tween 90 and 110 time ticks.
Case 2: 10 time ticks (simulation
time units)
Total simulated market
time
5000 time ticks: 3000 for warm-up
period and 2000 for active data col-
lection to determine the market be-
havior
Spectrum User Parameters
Number of Spectrum Users Variable: 4, 5, 6, 10, 20
Mean traffic Demand 4.0 Mbps
Mean Traffic Interarrival
Time
Uniformly distributed between 10
and 25 time ticks
Table 2: SPECTRAD Model Parameters
3 Results
The parameters and details presented in the previous section define the two
scenarios that we simulated in order to evaluate our proposal. In a first
instance, we considered the model in which the duration of the unlicensed
spectrum usage was exactly the same as that of the lifetime of the originally
used alternate technology units. Our goal in this scenario was to measure the
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impact of virtualization, itself, in the final market liquidity outcome. After
evaluating these results, we proceeded to refine certain details that seem
more appropriate to the actual behavior and usage of unlicensed spectrum
(which is the alternative to licensed spectrum that we are considering in
our current study). In this way, we would be able to determine if there is
further impact on the resulting market viability, and how this compares to
the original conditions of the SPECTRAD model.
In what follows, we will start by detailing the parameters and metrics that
we have considered for the market viability evaluation in subsection 3.1.
To conclude this section, we will present the actual market viability results
obtained in each of our two scenarios in subsection 3.2 .
3.1 Market Viability Score
The market viability score was developed in [11] as a means to develop a
quantifiable measure of how feasible it was for a given market to succeed.
This score is based in the following five criteria which are determinant char-
acteristics for the viability of a Band Manager Exchange Based-market:
• Probability of an empty bid list(%): As markets progress, market
participants whose bidding price is not competitive enough at the end
of the bidding rounds will opt for unlicensed spectrum. It may be
the case that these users will accumulate enough unlicensed spectrum
units that will make them likely to opt out from the upcoming licensed
spectrum bidding process. If all spectrum users reach this situation,
the bid list received by the Band Manager will be empty, which is an
undesirable condition for the market. The probability of an empty
bid list corresponds to the average probability that in a given period
of time there are no spectrum users making any bids for spectrum. A
high value of this factor represents of lack of activity in the market [11].
• Probability that demand is greater than supply(%): This pa-
rameter represents the probability that at a given time period, the
spectrum requests surpass the Band Manager spectrum holdings.
• Average cutoff price: The minimum cutoff price set in our model
is 50 monetary units. The higher the cutoff price in a bidding round,
higher the valuation of the spectrum in that specific round. Addition-
ally, this indicates that there was a significant level of market activity.
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On the other hand, when the cutoff price is exactly the minimum, it
indicates that the demand is not greater than the supply, and thus, the
spectrum price is not being set by the users’ activity in the market.
• Average number of assigned Resource Blocks(%): This param-
eter corresponds to the ratio of the amount of RBs that have been
assigned in the market and the RBs that were available in the pool and
controlled by the Band Manager. This metric gives us a notion of the
level of efficiency achieved in the assignment of the spectrum via our
market model.
• Average number of Unlicensed Spectrum units per spectrum
user: In our model, a spectrum user would normally need 4 bandwidth
units to fulfill his average traffic requirements. In this way, when users
hold a larger amount of unlicensed bandwidth units, it indicates that
they are utilizing only unlicensed spectrum to provide their services
(without making use of licensed spectrum). This factor is in turn as-
sociated with the degree of ease or difficulty to obtain spectrum from
the market.
Following the description above, and the guidelines provided in [11], Ta-
ble 3 shows the viability criteria and the actual thresholds that have been
considered for evaluation and final determination of market liquidity.
Factor Pass Fail Score
Pass/Fail
Probability of empty bid list = 0 > 0 1/-1
Probability that demand is
greater than supply
≥ 10% < 1% 1/-1
Average cutoff price N/A ≤ 51 0/-1
Percentage of assigned
spectrum
≥ Average
across all
markets
< Average
across all
markets
1/-1
Average number of unlicensed
spectrum units per SU
N/A ≥ 4 0/-1
Table 3: Evaluation Criteria for the Viability of the Simulated Spectrum Trading
Markets
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According to the conditions presented in table 3 and the data we obtained
in our simulations, we detail the results that we have obtained for each of
our simulation scenarios in the subsection that follows.
3.2 Simulation Results
The figures presented in each scenario correspond to the average values of 100
simulation runs for each combination of parameters applicable to our model
details. More specifically, given that we have considered that the maximum
availability of LTE resources would correspond to three 10MHz bands in the
700 MHz range, this provides us with a spectrum pool that could have a
minimum of 18 RBs and a maximum of 150 RBs. We have constructed our
simulation scheme following the same approach as in [11]. Thus, we utilized
the variable “R” as a means to determine the number of RBs available in the
market, as explained through the expression in (3).
number of RBs = number of SUs×R (3)
For each of our two simulation scenarios, we have considered different
combinations of spectrum users and RBs available following the values of
R presented in Table 4. Note that for the availability of RBs, we have
considered values that could be aggregated through the addition of allowable
quantities of RBs from the three 700 MHz bands. In case the exact value
was not achievable, we used the closest (allowed and higher) amount of RBs
for our simulation; for example, in the case of 4 spectrum users and R =
5, we would need a pool of 20 RBs in our simulation. We could not use a
standard-compliant amount of RBs from the 3 bands to obtain this value.
Instead, we used instead a pool of 21 RBs, which results from aggregating
15 RBs from one band and 6 RBs from another. In the same way, we have
limited our simulated combinations to those resulting in values ≤ 150, hence,
our simulated scenarios for 10 spectrum users end at R = 15, and in the case
of 20 spectrum users, we consider only R = 5.
Under these circumstances, for both of the scenarios we have analyzed,
we present the results particular to each of the market viability evaluation
criteria we mentioned in subsection 3.1, and we finally include the resulting
viability score that has been obtained in what follows.
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Parameter Value
Number of SUs 4, 5, 6, 10, 20
R 5, 10, 15, 20, 15
Number of RBs Number of SUs × R
Table 4: Combination of Parameters for Simulation Scenarios
3.2.1 Scenario 1
We tested our first, conservative approach, in order to remain as close to
the original model as possible, and still be able to incorporate the expected
notions of virtualization and technology compliance details (i.e., LTE-A stan-
dard parameters). In this subsection, we show the results of this first tested
scenario. We start by showing how the model performed regarding each of
the evaluated viability criteria in Figures 1 - 5, and we finally aggregate our
results in the market viability scores, which can be observed in figure 6.
Probability of Empty Bid List
As spectrum scarcity diminishes in the market, the probability that there
will be an empty bid list decreases as well. Under these circumstances, spec-
trum users have more access to the spectrum, thus, they are less likely to
accumulate unlicensed spectrum units, which is the main cause for the lack
of bidding activity. The results we present in figure 1 are consistent with the
explanation above. We can see that in situations where there is not enough
spectrum (R=5) and we have only a few spectrum users (SUs = 4), the prob-
ability of having an empty bid list is equal to 4.8%, whereas in situations of
spectrum oversupply (R=25) and with a large number of market participants
(SUs= 20), the probability of having an empty bid list drops to 0%.
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Figure 1: Probability that bid list is empty in Scenario 1
Probability that demand is greater than supply
In the case of demand and supply, as the provision of spectrum in the mar-
ket increases, the value of this factor drops. In the same fashion, greater the
number of market participants, greater the probability that spectrum de-
mand in the market will surpass the Band Manager’s spectrum inventory. In
this particular scenario, we observe that the best conditions for this param-
eter are those of spectrum scarcity, when R = 5 and there are 20 spectrum
users, with a probability of Demand being greater than supply of 58.8%,
while the worst case we encountered presented a level of 8.4%, when R = 25
and we have only 4 spectrum users in the market. Figure 2 shows all the
values pertaining for the different cases we tested in this simulated scenario.
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Figure 2: Probability that demand is greater than supply results for Scenario 1
Average cutoff price
In cases where there is spectrum scarcity in the market (i.e., R = 5) the price
paid to obtain this desired commodity will be considerably high, especially
when compared to situations of spectrum oversupply. This trend can be
corroborated in figure 3, where we can find an average cutoff price as high
as 108.1 monetary units when R = 5 and SUs = 20, and this price can drop
to 57.6 when R = 25 and SUs = 4.
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Figure 3: Average cutoff price results for Scenario 1
Percentage of assigned spectrum
As the supply of spectrum increases in the market, there is less efficiency in
the assignment of spectrum. For this particular parameter, our best results
are obtained when R = 5 and there are 20 spectrum users with an 85.7%
of the spectrum being assigned. The worst case correspond to the situation
where R = 25 and there are only 4 spectrum users, which results in an
assignment of the 43.4% of the spectrum. It should be noted that given
the particular requirements for spectrum assignment inherent to the LTE
standard, in situations where there is spectrum under supply, we can observe
that the resulting assignment is not completely smooth across the distribution
of spectrum users. This irregularity disappears as the spectrum availability
increases in the market.
Taking into account our aggregate data, we have determined that the average
percentage of assigned spectrum in this scenario is 61%. This is the value that
we have considered as our threshold for the calculation of the final market
viability score.
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Figure 4: Percentage of assigned Resource Blocks in Scenario 1
Average number of unlicensed spectrum units per spectrum user
It follows intuition that as spectrum supply increases, spectrum users will
have higher opportunities to obtain licensed RBs from the market, and thus,
they will opt for less unlicensed spectrum units (if at all). This can be sup-
ported by the results presented in figure 5. As it can be observed, in scenarios
of spectrum oversupply, spectrum users will hold on to 1.3 unlicensed band-
width units on average, while on the case of spectrum under supply, this
value will be slightly above 4. We should remember that given the char-
acteristics of our model, spectrum users need on average 4 unlicensed units
to fulfill their traffic requirements. Hence, it is important to mention, that
even if there is a notorious difference between our best and worst cases, spec-
trum users in this scenario are not accumulating unlicensed units above their
average unlicensed spectrum requirement.
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Figure 5: Average number of unlicensed spectrum bandwidth units per spectrum
user in Scenario 1
Final Market Viability Score for Scenario 1
After evaluating the data we obtained via simulations with the criteria pre-
sented in 3, we obtained the final Market Viability Score for this first scenario,
which is presented in figure 6.
Our first goal with this calculation is to determine the feasibility of a market
system carried out under virtualization concepts, and at the same time, con-
trast this values with those obtained with the first version of SPECTRAD,
(presented in [11]), in order to find out whether there is improvement in the
market liquidity conditions.
25
Figure 6: Market Viability Score for Scenario 1
Our results present a degree of improvement from those obtained in [11]
for the simulated markets, including a new viable market in the list. Never-
theless, we coincide with the original model on the situations in which viable
markets can be achieved, which is when R = 5, R = 10 and R = 15. None
of the aforementioned cases represent situations of spectrum oversupply. We
should remember that in the case of R = 10 and R = 15, the maximum num-
ber of spectrum users we tested, given our spectrum availability settings, is
10. What should be remarked is that in our R = 10 case, all the combinations
of users we tested resulted in a viable outcome.
3.2.2 Scenario 2
Once we have analyzed the results of our initial approach, we would like
to explore the impact of further changes in our model in the final market
liquidity. The main variation in this scenario corresponds to the duration of
the usage of the unlicensed spectrum bandwidth units, which corresponds to
the same amount of time as the licensed spectrum lease. We present them in
the following figures. Again, figures 7 - 10 show the detailed values obtained
for each viability criteria, while figure 11 presents the final market viability
score obtained in this new scenario.
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Probability that demand is greater than supply
In figure 7 we can observe a significant improvement in the values of the
probability of having demand being greater than supply. In this particular
scenario, the new (shorter) duration of unlicensed spectrum usage prompts
spectrum users to be more active participants in the market, increasing the
values associated with this factor. Indeed, when R = 5, for all the different
user groups we have considered, the demand is always greater than the supply
(100% probability). The lowest value of this factor corresponds to 18.3%,
which represents the case where R = 25 and there are 4 spectrum users
participating in the market (i.e., spectrum oversupply). It is important to
point out that even under these oversupply conditions, the rate of this factor
does not drop to extremely low values (i.e., < 1%), which were considered as
signs of lack of liquidity in the original model.
Figure 7: Probability that demand is greater than supply results for Scenario 2
Average cutoff price
The increase of the participation of spectrum users in the market has an
important impact in the average cutoff price as well. Under this new model,
the highest cutoff price rises up to 161.8 monetary units and it occurs under
spectrum scarcity circumstances, specifically when R = 5 and there are 20
spectrum users in the market. The lowest cutoff price, 66.5 monetary units,
is obtained in oversupply situations, when R = 25 and only 4 spectrum users
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are participating in the market. All the results obtained for this factor can
be observed in figure 8.
Figure 8: Average cutoff price results for Scenario 2
Percentage of assigned spectrum
As we had previously mentioned, the process of assigning spectrum becomes
more complex when incorporating LTE into the model as we need to consider
a set of rules inherent to the standard. For this specific reason, in situations
when spectrum is scarce (e.g., R=5), the progression in spectrum assignment
is not entirely smooth. This was already evidenced in our previous simulated
scenario. In spite of this situation, we can observe an increase in the efficiency
of spectrum assignment in this particular case. The highest percentage of
RBs assigned is 99.2%, which is achieved when R = 5, while the lowest is
52.1%, achieved when R = 25. Figure 9 shows the values obtained for this
parameter in the simulations performed for this second scenario.
Considering our aggregate data, we have estimated that the average percent-
age of assigned RBs, considering all of our performed simulations is 76%.
This is the threshold that we have considered for the estimation of the final
market viability score, regarding this criterion, in this second scenario.
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Figure 9: Percentage of assigned Resource Blocks in Scenario 2
Average number of unlicensed spectrum units per spectrum user
This factor is associated with the main variation we performed in this second
scenario, thus, we expected to obtain a significant change in the resulting
values. Indeed, as we can observe in figure 10, the maximum amount of
unlicensed bandwidth units that have been accumulated on average by the
spectrum users is approximately 2.3. This value progressively decreases until
it reaches 0.37 in situations of spectrum oversupply. Even the maximum value
obtained is well below the average number of unlicensed bandwidth units
that spectrum users need to satisfy the traffic requirements in the market (4
Bandwidth units).
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Figure 10: Average number of unlicensed spectrum bandwidth units per spectrum
user in Scenario 2
Probability of Empty Bid List
In this scenario, the resulting probability of having an empty bid list is zero
in all the cases that we have tested. This is the consequence of the limited
duration of the usage of the unlicensed spectrum. Given that the licensed
spectrum lease and the usage time of unlicensed spectrum last the same
period (10 simulation time units), spectrum users are prompted to participate
in the market and determine whether they are competitive enough to obtain
licensed spectrum leases.
Final Market Viability Score for Scenario 2
After seeing significant improvements in the particular criteria for the market
viability evaluation, we present in figure 11 the scores that we have obtained.
As it can be observed, in this new scenario, we find positive outcomes for
all the cases we have tested, including when we take into account spectrum
under supply and oversupply conditions. Moreover, these favorable outcomes
include the presence of a small number of market participants, which is the
situation that most resembles our current telecommunications market struc-
ture.
30
Figure 11: Market Viability Score for Scenario 2
4 Discussion
In order to discuss the results we presented in the previous section, we shall
remember that the main reason why we decided to incorporate wireless net-
works virtualization notions in a spectrum trading model was to be able to
find a trading commodity that would bring thickness to the market and hence
would improve the overall market liquidity outcome.
In the first scenario, compared to the original version of SPECTRAD, we
could only evidence a slight improvement in liquidity. Nevertheless, we
should remember that in this particular case, our assumption of “perfect spec-
trum fungibility” is framed within an existing technology, which is LTE-A.
Additionally, if we pay attention to particular details such as the probability
that demand is greater than supply, we can already find significant improve-
ments which are inherent to the implementation of the pool of LTE resource
blocks in our model. We find that under the new circumstances, there is
not a one-to-one mapping of capacity (i.e., one resource block represents a
specific capacity value), instead, a group of resource blocks is associated with
specific values of capacity, which in turn has its impact on the bids that users
post, and consequently in the overall demand in the market.
The second scenario we presented, not only represents significant individual
improvements for the market viability criteria, but also for the overall market
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scores. One of the main factors that contributes to this liquidity enhance-
ment is the fact that the probability of having a bid list empty has decreased
to zero for all the tested scenarios. This is a direct representative of the in-
creased participation of the spectrum users in the market, which has further
implications on the positive variations of the remaining viability criteria.
Figure 12 presents the market viability results obtained in the three versions
of SPECTRAD that have been mentioned throughout our work. The left-
most graph corresponds to the original SPECTRAD model presented in [11],
showing the values that are comparable to the model presented in this anal-
ysis. The center and rightmost figures correspond to the viability scores
for Scenarios 1 and 2, which were already introduced in section 3. In this
figure, we can visually appreciate the changes that the adoption of wireless
virtualization has brought to our specific spectrum trading model.
Figure 12: Comparison of the Market Viability Scores for different SPECTRAD
Model Versions
4.1 Additional Technical Details
Regarding carrier aggregation, the current release of the LTE standard con-
templates the association of only certain bands for the intra-band and inter-
band deployment of this procedure. Nevertheless, for ease of implementation
of our model, and given that we were already restricting it to a rather small
set of available bands in the United States, we contemplated the fact that
these three bands could be associated with each other for carrier aggregation
purposes, even if the standard does not support this yet. The different pa-
rameters and specifications regarding carrier aggregation have significantly
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evolved in the past releases of the LTE standard, it is in this way that we
have considered that the bands we have assumed to be compatible may be
included in upcoming releases, thus supporting the validity of our analysis.
5 Conclusions and Future Research
Our current work represents our first step towards incorporating wireless
virtualization concepts in a spectrum trading scenario. By introducing in
the market, the notion of a pool of spectrum resources by taking advantage
of the benefits of the LTE-standard, we have been able to provide further
opportunities for spectrum users to opt for spectrum in the market. At
the same time, this has permitted us to refine traded commodity, which has
increased the scenarios in which we can find viable markets. We still consider,
however, that our model can be further enhanced by delving deeper into
features and advantages that are offered by (and can be exploited from) the
LTE-A standard and additional virtualization nuances.
Another important step we would like to take is the diversification of the
possibilities available to the market participants (spectrum users) in terms of
the pool of spectrum resources. For instance, we would like the pool to cover
spectrum belonging to the IEEE 802.11 standard in the 5GHz range, due to
the considerable amount of bandwidth available in this band. In this way,
we could explore the benefits and constraints of this spectrum diversification
in the market behavior, and perhaps determine further realizable market
scenarios.
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